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Introduction 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Anne 0. Krueger, and Richard H. Snape 
This symposium issue of The World Bank Economic Review contains a selection 
of articles originally presented as papers at a conference on the role and interests 
of the developing countries in the multilateral trade negotiations held from 
October 30 to November 1, 1986, in Bangkok.1 Proposed by Anne Krueger, 
then Vice President of Economics and Research, the World Bank, the conference 
was designed by Jagdish Bhagwati and held under the auspices of the World 
Bank and the Thailand Development Research Institute. A few words to intro- 
duce the issue and to situate its contents in the current policy context are in 
order. 
I. MARKET ACCESS AND PROTECTIONISM 
The developing countries no longer need to be persuaded that access to for- 
eign markets is important for their development. The economic success of the 
outward-oriented economies of East Asia has been decisive in changing many 
minds on this subject.2 The real worry now is whether protectionism will not 
frustrate the converts as they seek the benefits of the export-promoting strategy. 
The postwar period opened with much skepticism as to the feasibility of an 
export-oriented growth strategy. This "first export pessimism" (Bhagwati, forth- 
coming) was based on an assessment of natural market forces: the markets were 
not thought to be deep enough to absorb the exports-which were then predom- 
inantly of primary products-of an expanding developing world.3 By contrast, 
the current "second export pessimism" is based not on the view that markets do 
not exist but rather on the gloomy view that once these markets are entered 
protectionism will close them. 
1. In addition, one paper by Chong-Hyun Nam has been included because it complements well the 
analysis by Finger and Nogues of the issues raised by countervailing duty actions. 
2. In addition, numerous studies have shown that the outward-oriented countries have consistently 
performed better than those countries following an import-substituting strategy (see Balassa 1986; 
Bhagwati, forthcoming; Krueger 1983). 
3. Among the contributory factors in this pessimism was the worry that synthetics were replacing 
natural products and that technical progress was simultaneously reducing inputs per unit of output (see 
Nurkse 1959). 
Jagdish Bhagwati is a professor of economics and politics at Columbia University and currently a 
consultant to the World Bank. Anne 0. Krueger is a professor of economics at Duke University. Richard 
H. Snape is the editor of The World Bank Economic Review and of The World Bank Research Observer. 
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The second pessimism is thus man-made. It can therefore be eliminated by 
human action. Hence the new (as distinct from the old) pessimism requires, not 
adaptation to a situation that must be accepted as given, but rather a strategic 
response to alter the situation. 
II. MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: RATIONALE 
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) is part of that 
strategy. First, there is the old "bicycle" theory. As protectionism intensifies in 
the congresses and parliaments, which respond to sectoral interests, the execu- 
tives find it profitable to engage in trade negotiations and talks to keep momen- 
tum going in favor of freer trade. Ongoing negotiations also make it easier to 
keep protectionist legislators in check by invoking the possibility of upsetting 
delicately poised talks, while in the United States the delegation of authority to 
the executive to negotiate tariff reductions depends on rounds of trade negotia- 
tions (Snape 1987). In short, the smart way to keep freer trade going is to keep 
negotiating it: as with a bicycle, if you stop moving, you fall off. 
Second, it is evident that the ability of the United States to bring the MTN to a 
start in Uruguay was a result not of consensus on the issues but almost entirely 
of the fear on the part of the trading partners of the United States that there was 
a real likelihood that the protectionist forces would triumph in the U.S. Con- 
gress if the efforts to launch the MTN failed. This fear was not sufficiently strong 
when the earlier U.S. efforts to start trade talks failed at the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ministerial meeting in November 1982. 
Third and equally important, the MTN also represent part of the protection- 
containment strategy of the United States in a different sense. In a pluralistic 
framework, lobbying pressures for protection are usually more potent than 
pressures for freer trade, since typically the benefits of protection accrue to a few 
(producers) while the costs are spread over many (consumers). Given the 
strength of the protectionist sentiment in recent years, the Reagan administra- 
tion has been looking for "countervailing" lobbies that favor trade rather than 
protection, thus assisting in the growth and success of the export lobbies for 
sectors such as agriculture and services. Aside from bilateral moves in these 
areas, the United States has seen the MTN as the principal arena where these 
protrade interests can be given play. 
III. UNIQUENESS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The Uruguay Round, however, is unique from the viewpoint of the developing 
countries. It marks a sufficiently radical departure from the earlier GATT rounds 
in that, more than ever, it calls for the developing countries to engage actively in 
the negotiations. 
Historically, the developing countries were not particularly active participants 
in the tariff-cutting exercises of the postwar period. With the GATT'S well-known 
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focus on first-difference reciprocity in trade negotiations,4 and the exemption 
traditionally accorded to developing countries from reciprocity, it was inevitable 
that the incentive afforded to developing countries to engage actively in the GATT 
rounds was small. This incentive was reduced further by the effective exclusion 
from the GATT negotiations of major agricultural products, important exports 
for many developing countries. The possibility of concessions by developed 
countries on agriculture could have induced greater interest in the GATT and 
possibly reciprocal bargaining by some developing countries; the waivers from 
the provisions of the GATT given to the United States and European countries in 
the late 1950s for their agricultural production effectively closed this door. 
Developing countries therefore did not participate actively in the earlier GATT 
rounds.5 The benefits of generalized tariff cuts came to them simply by way of 
their most favored nation (mfn) rights as GATT members. 
The failure of developing countries to offer reciprocal tariff cuts or similar 
measures to increase access to their markets may have contributed to the bias of 
the tariff cuts away from the labor-intensive manufactured exports of the devel- 
oping countries.6 Finger (1979) has produced data on how U.S. imports were 
affected by Kennedy Round concessions7 which show that the lower the partici- 
pation by a group of countries in the Kennedy Round negotiations, the lower the 
share of U.S. imports from that group that benefited from U.S. concessions: 
Affected 1964 U.S. imports asa 
Country group percentage of imports 
from each country group 
Major participants 70 
Other developed-country participants 49 
Active developing-country participants 33 
Other developing countries S 
Moreover, aside from nonreciprocity in tariff bargaining, the developing 
countries generally enjoyed Special and Differential (S&D) treatment in two 
ways: (i) they were granted preferential entry under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) on their exports to developed countries, their market access 
being thus exempt from the MFN obligation of GATT membership; (ii) they were 
4. By first-difference reciprocity, we mean reciprocity or balancing of trade concessions at the margin to 
be contrasted with full reciprocity or the "level playing fields" approach (see World Bank 1987, box 8-6). 
5. Additional factors, such as the asymmetry of market-access obligations, are discussed below. 
6. Cheh (1974) argued that exemptions from tariff cuts in the Kennedy Round largely centered on 
labor-related variables and therefore that the government could be minimizing "short-run adjustment 
costs," reflecting a "noneconomic" objective. (The absence of developing countries from the reciprocal 
negotiating table made it easier for developed countries to grant this assistance to labor.) Such a nonutili- 
tarian objective was introduced into an augmented social utility function by Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1969) (following on the earlier work of Corden 1957 and Johnson 1965) in which consumption and 
sectoral allocation of labor were also considered as such noneconomic objectives. An alternative, but less 
plausible, interpretation seems to be that labor was an effective lobbyist perhaps because a "benign" 
government does have adjustment-cost-minimization for displaced labor in its objective function. 
7. Tariff reductions and bindings. 
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permitted extensive exemptions from obligations to provide access to their do- 
mestic markets (termed reverse market access) on either infant-industry or bal- 
ance of payments grounds, implicitly or explicitly under GATT Article XVIII. 
An important consequence was an asymmetry of obligations between the 
developing and the developed countries under the GATT. This reinforced the lack 
of incentive to bargain in the GATT rounds. Equally, a chief consequence was the 
ease with which the developing countries could sustain unity in their trade 
positions. For as long as S&D was the ruling principle, the governments of the 
developing countries had a commonality of interests and a fairly unified agenda. 
They could have preferential access to external markets while choosing their 
own preferred level of openness or closedness without needing to offer reciprocal 
access. 
This convenient deal and the resulting unity of the developing countries had 
origins and rationales that have now seriously weakened, resulting in both a 
differentiation of their trade interests and the need to participate actively in the 
Uruguay Round. 
The rationale for preferential market access for the exports of developing 
countries was varied. It was sometimes justified as an extension of the infant- 
industry argument: preferential access implied that the infant was protected in 
foreign, not just domestic, markets. The primary rationale, however, was that it 
would be a form of "disguised" aid. The GSP schemes were part of a wider 
agenda of mechanisms designed to transfer more resources to the developing 
countries as budget-financed foreign aid programs faltered. The special drawing 
rights-link proposal was one such device. The GSP schemes were another. The 
implicit argument went something like this. Assume that the proposed benefi- 
ciary of a GSP program would like to export a certain amount. Given a preferen- 
tial duty, this beneficiary then enjoys a terms of trade gain in not having to cut its 
export price by the amount of the preference, and the importing country offering 
the preference correspondingly loses tariff revenue.8 
But if GSP schemes were intended to be such a mechanism for transferring aid, 
it equally meant that the GSP in practice would be characterized by the politics of 
aid. And that is precisely what happened. These preferential-entry schemes were 
tightly controlled by beneficiary and product. Equality of treatment on prefer- 
ences was not available for all developing countries nor for all among them who 
were GATT members. Nor would there be bindings. The GSP would be subject to 
periodic renewal: beneficiaries, product coverage, and degree of preference 
would all be at the discretion of the importing country exactly as aid flows are. 
Economists have debated whether the GSP produced significant welfare gains. 
The consensus seems to be that, granted as an "unrequited transfer" (that is, 
without direct reciprocal benefits), these schemes have generally produced few 
benefits in total-though there are significant gains for some countries. In gen- 
8. The actual economics is of course more complicated. What is stated in the text is the implied 
argument underlying the case for GSP as an aid mechanism. 
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eral, preferences are low and the coverage limited, often excluding items in 
which the developing countries have significant export advantage while includ- 
ing items such as jet aircraft. Of the United States's $120.3 billion in imports 
from developing countries in 1981, the total from GSP beneficiaries was $68.5 
billion, and of this only $8.4 billion entered duty-free.9 Again, analyses of the 
European Economic Community's GSP show that imports from nonbeneficiaries 
grew faster than those from beneficiaries (World Bank 1987, p. 167). 
Several economists have wondered thus whether it was sensible for the devel- 
oping countries to have pushed for the GSP benefits rather than for nonpreferen- 
tial, generalized barrier reductions on products of interest to them. To suggest 
that the latter would have produced greater results in practice (without reciproc- 
ity) seems debatable, to say the least, and the evidence on the evolution of the 
Multifibre Arrangement would seem to militate against such a notion. Also 
unpersuasive is the criticism sometimes advanced that the GSP may have encour- 
aged protectionism by prompting the protectionist lobbies to cite it as an added 
and obnoxious source of market disruption. While U.S. congressional testimo- 
nies to this effect are not lacking, can one seriously maintain that this does little 
more than lend some color to the protectionist outcry? 
We now turn to the rationale for the lack of reverse market access to the 
developing countries themselves. Here, the economic philosophy of infant indus- 
try protection and the theory that balance of payments difficulties justified ongo- 
ing exchange and trade restrictions helped to legitimize the general exemptions 
from conventional GATT rules that the developing countries were granted, under 
Article XVIII (B) and Part IV in particular. Given these economic theories, which 
were widely shared at the time, it is arguable that the developed countries saw 
the accommodation of asymmetric obligations as desirable and legitimate, even 
though the GATT is a contract, the essence of which is the notion of symmetric 
rights and obligations (Bhagwati and Irwin 1987). 
But aside from these economic perspectives, it may be argued that the willing- 
ness of the developed countries, and particularly of the United States, to permit 
these asymmetries reflected two other political-economy-theoretic elements. 
First, the developing countries' share of world trade was sufficiently small for 
the question of reverse market access to be considered relatively unimportant. 
The transaction cost of insisting on reciprocal obligations was not commensu- 
rate with potential benefits. 
Second, the United States can plausibly be regarded as the guarantor of the 
liberal international economic order, embodied in the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the GATT, and therefore to have been willing (albeit reluctantly) to accom- 
modate the developing countries in their desire to maintain asymmetric rights 
under the GATT by appropriate modifications such as Part IV. Such an accommo- 
dation would permit the GATT'S continued comprehensive membership, while 
not seriously compromising its integrity, since the developing countries were not 
9. Billion is 1,000 million. 
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yet important actors on the trade scene.10 The acceptance of developing coun- 
tries as "free riders" in the GATT system would therefore have been logical. 
By now, however, the rationales for asymmetry of obligations, which are aid 
transfer and balance of payments considerations, have weakened. The effective 
rationale for GSP was aid transfer. But this implies that beneficiary developing 
economies that have ceased to require aid are likely to be forced out of the 
schemes. This is the "graduation" issue now on the negotiating agenda. The 
candidates for such (involuntary) graduation are those which are successful 
exporters, are advanced industrially, or have reached high standards of living. 
Brazil, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan are among the candidates. For the 
heavily indebted among them, with necessity to find markets abroad to earn 
foreign exchange for their debt service, this raises problems since loss of GSP 
benefits is tantamount to having tariffs raised against them. 
The developing countries' rationale for denial of access to their own markets 
has weakened even further. The economic theory of balance of payments man- 
agement has changed with the advent of flexible exchange rates. It is not possible 
to argue convincingly that a developing country needs to be wedded to long-term 
controls to ration the use of foreign exchange when exchange rates can be 
changed. Nor can many adherents be found for the view that such controls offer 
a feasible way of permanently curing payments imbalances that reflect sustained 
macroeconomic imbalances. The economic theory underlying GATT Article 
XVIII (B) is outmoded. 
Equally, the major developed countries are not willing any longer to see the 
more successful developing countries get by without reciprocal opening of their 
markets. The growth of reciprocitarian ideas in the United States has been 
particularly dramatic, with politicians and industry demanding "level playing 
fields" from the East Asian and many other larger developing economies. These 
markets are now substantial; the rise of successful new competitors crowds the 
producers of the "diminished giant" that the United States is now in the world 
economy; and the long period of U.S. trade deficits has fueled the exaggerated 
sense that Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and other larger developing economies have 
prospered by closing their markets and enjoying access to the open markets of 
the United States. Reverse market access is therefore a major new issue that the 
newily industrialized economies face today. The issue is likely to become impor- 
tant for more developing economies in the longer run. 
IV. THE ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS 
The Uruguay Round opens with an altogether new scenario for the developing 
countries. Issues which were taken for granted over the last two decades are now 
on the agenda. The agenda includes new sectors, such as services, for which the 
10. This view fits in with the Gramscian thesis that a hegemonic power seeks such marginal accommo- 
dations with the nonhegemonic nations during its ideological primacy. 
This content downloaded  on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 13:46:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Bhagwati, Krueger, and Snape 545 
developed countries mainly seek well-defined GATT-style access to foreign mar- 
kets as part of the overall conception of level playing fields or reciprocity. It also 
includes a serious attempt to address agricultural protection, an issue of export 
interest to many developing as well as developed countries. Agricultural ex- 
porters have been particularly frustrated in the GATT in the past, frustration that 
has discouraged them from offering concessions in GATT negotiations. In addi- 
tion, questions about asymmetry of obligations, and about graduation on both 
market access and reverse market access, have become key. 
The effect of these critical developments is to drag the developing countries, 
however unenthusiastically, into the MTN, where they will have to give in order 
to receive. But this also means that their interests will diverge depending on the 
issues and sectors in question, whereas simply receiving (S&D) united them with 
considerable ease in the past. These divergent interests will surely criss-cross 
both developing and developed countries, making likely the formation of negoti- 
ating groups that embrace coalitions of like-interested countries, whether devel- 
oping or developed. Thus the Group of Ten (led by Brazil and India) opposed the 
inclusion of services on the agenda; many of the smaller developing countries 
deserted this position and went instead with major developed countries in the 
Group of Forty-eight coalition. And in the Cairns group of "fair-trading" agri- 
cultural exporters, Australia and Canada are joined by Argentina, Thailand, 
and Uruguay (among others) as forceful members. 
V. THE BANGKOK CONFERENCE AND THIS SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 
The Bankgok conference was designed to identify these interests within the 
framework of the sectoral and systematic issues likely to emerge at the MTN. The 
focus was on analyzing these interests rather than on suggesting specific pre- 
scriptions on issues, coalitions, and negotiating strategies. 
The conference papers selected for this symposium issue of the Review fall 
into two broad groups. The first set deals with major new sectors, services 
(Bhagwati) and agriculture (Valdes, Sathirathai and Siamwalla) and with one 
perennial sector, textiles (Cable), in which the Multifibre Arrangement has just 
been renegotiated, which is of importance in the overall framework of the world 
trading system.1I 
The second set deals with systemic issues. In view of the critical relevance of 
the S&D issues, Wolf addresses the underpinnings of this asymmetry of obliga- 
tions, whereas Anjaria considers in depth Article XVIII (B) and the attendant 
balance of payments justification for denying reverse market access. These sys- 
11. The Sathirathai and Siamwalla case study of cassava exports from Thailand shows how critical is 
legal and negotiating expertise in handling trade issues (and/or improved dispute settlement procedures 
in the GATT), and how the GATT may need to be strengthened to assist the smaller developing countries. 
As developing countries enter the era of trade negotiations, this question will surely assume more 
importance. 
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temic questions impair the ability of the developing countries to participate 
symmetrically in the GATT as originally conceived. They are directly at issue in 
the intellectual debate on the world trading system and are explicitly or implic- 
itly on the MTN agenda. 
The critical systemic issues of the developed countries are altogether different. 
The developed countries do not resort to trade restrictions to deal with payments 
difficulties; nor do they comprehensively invoke infant-industry and related ar- 
guments for systematically rejecting foreign access to their markets. But their 
failure to adhere to the original GATT rule of law comes rather from their 
inability to deal with the sectoral politics of market disruption, reflected in part 
by their tendency to bypass the safeguards clause (Article XIX) in the GATT by 
resorting instead to bilateral arrangements such as voluntary export restraints 
(VERS). Hindley's paper addresses in a novel way the question of reforming 
Article XIX while keeping developing-country interests explicitly in the fore- 
front. 
Yet another worrisome development has been the tendency in developed coun- 
tries to use the countervailing duty and antidumping mechanisms, designed to 
offset so-called unfair competition under free trade, as protectionist instruments 
instead. By harassing foreign suppliers with frivolous complaints, for instance by 
invoking these processes for minuscule subsidies, these instruments can be cap- 
tured by protectionist interests and utilized to intimidate foreign competitors 
into accepting VERS and similar trade restrictions. Finger and Nogues, as also 
Nam, explore the facts on these mechanisms in depth; the former paper also 
offers an assessment of the harassment issue. 
The issue does not offer a comprehensive guide to all the topics on the MTN 
agenda. It omits, for instance, protection of intellectual property rights and 
trade-related investment rules. But it should provide a handy and illuminating 
guide to the principal questions that developing economies must ask and answer 
as they negotiate at the MTN. 
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